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Pornographies* 
LESLIE GREEN 
Law and Philosophy, York University, Toronto 
 
I. PARADIGMS OF PORNOGRAPHY 
O  be  radical  about  pornography  used  to  mean  that  one  favored  less 
censorship; now it often means that one favors more. That political change 
reflects a shift in the dominant paradigm of pornography and its putative evils. 
Until quite recently, most people who believed pornography wrong thought that 
it offended against decency and propriety and was therefore obscene. That was 
certainly the view of the law. English judges first created the crime of obscene 
libel in 1727 on the basis that such expression tended to corrupt the morals of the 
King's  subjects,1   a  thought  that  inspired  most  subsequent  legislation  in  the 
common-law world. Sometimes the underlying concern really was paternalistic: 
pornography degrades and corrupts its producers and consumers; the law forces 
them to become better people. More often, however, it was just moralism of the 
familiar sorts: the view that a majority of a community is entitled to enforce its 
moral views on the rest, either because that is democratic or because that is just 
what it means to be a community. The obscenity paradigm thus had two features. 
First, it was illiberal: it ranked personal autonomy below realizing the good, 
 enforcing the majority will, or embodying communitarian values.  Second, it 
was gender neutral: to understand the nature of pornography did not require 
theorizing relat ions between  men and women.  On the obscenity  
paradigm, pornography was a matter of virtue versus vice, majorities versus 
minorities. 
The new paradigm is importantly different, for now the antagonists are 
understood to be men versus women. First, the kind of moral concern 
pornography raises is no longer thought to be a matter of decency or 
propriety, and the injury it does is neither personal nor social corruption. 
Pornography, as the subtitle of Andrea Dworkin's book puts it, is about men 
possessing women.''2 In the words of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea 
Dworkin's model legislation, it is  the graphic sexually explicit subordination 
ofwomen in pictures and/or words.''3 Thus, pornography is understood to be 
harmful to women, and public policy in this area is a special case of fulfilling the 
duty to prevent harm. How is pornography harmful? First, it desensitizes men 
and incites them to rape, abuse and discriminate against women. It may also 
encourage some women to internalize men's view of them as sexual objects 
open to such abuse. Those are its contingent causal effects. But it also harms in a 
second way, by legitimating and even constituting certain practices of sex 
discrimination: on this view, pornography simply is the subordination and 
silencing of women.4 
The new paradigm consorts easily with liberal values, and one should not be 
misled by the fact that its most articulate defenders are feminists who say 
 they reject liberalism, nor by the fact that many self-styled liberals reject the 
restrictions on freedom of expression that these feminists endorse. Its liberal 
credentials are signaled not merely by the fact that it endorses personal 
autonomy, but by its settled preference for autonomy over decency, democracy 
or community. It does, however, insist that autonomy must be made real and that 
it must be for all. The free speech of men silences the free speech of women,'' 
says MacKinnon, It is the same social goal, just other people.''5 That the liberty 
of some may be restricted to promote a greater liberty of all is not in itself a 
radical thought. What is new and challenging is rather the claim that that is what 
censorship actually does. 
Not only does the new paradigm offer a recognizably liberal argument, it also 
offers a moral argument about pornography, for it endorses (or is at least 
consistent with) the familiar harm principle. Indeed, since J.S. Mill claimed that 
the sole valid reason for exercising coercive power over rational adults is to 
prevent harm to others, this has been a centerpiece of liberal political morality.6 
So one should not be misled by the fact that many feminists would also say, 
with MacKinnon, that pornography is not a moral issue.''7 They only mean 
that we should not restrict pornography in order to  enforce conventional 
morality, while conceding that if that were the aim, then we should favor 
freedom of expression instead. They also believe, however, that conceptual 
and empirical considerations show that pornography is extremely harmful, at 
least to women, and thus belongs with other categories of expression that 
areproperly subject to restriction. That explains why, as I said at the outset, 
 the old radicalism of opposing censorship has been replaced by a new 
radicalism favoring it. 
The paradigm  shift has  not, of  course,  been  complete  in  either theory or 
practice. Among philosophers, there is still considerable debate about how best 
to understand the concept of harm'' for these purposes. There is no argument 
about things like being raped, beaten, enslaved or discriminated against. The 
worries surround the ideas of being subordinated'' or silenced,'' notions which 
can slide into feeling subordinated or feeling silenced, which are in turn 
inextricably bound up with feeling put upon, outraged or offended, at which 
point we may approach moralism of the old sort. So there is a theoretical dispute 
about exactly how the old and new paradigms are to be distinguished, and a good 
deal of polemic on the part of anti-censorship writers trying to push pro- 
censorship writers back into the obscenity model together, it must be said, with a 
certain amount of unprovoked backsliding on the part of  the  pro-censorship 
forces themselves. 
At the level of practice things are even more ambiguous. We can develop our 
theories afresh but we must often reform our institutions piecemeal, especially 
when that reform is undertaken by judges. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in a judgment much admired by supporters of the new paradigm, tried 
to fashion the silk purse of harm-prevention out of the sow's ear of moralism. In 
R. v. Butler, the Court recycled the obscenity prohibitions of the Criminal Code, 
holding that material is obscene not because it offends against morals, but 
because it is perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society, particularly to 
 women.''8 On that basis it upheld criminal obscenity laws against a challenge 
based on freedom of expression. However, it seems that the Court did not fully 
understand the distinction it adopted. For the new paradigm prohibits things that 
are in fact harmful, not things that are perceived by public opinion'' to be 
harmful. Unwilling, or perhaps unable,9 to let go fully of moralism, the Court 
found the things perceived harmful to be those very things held repugnant by 
present conventional morality; it said that pornography is second-class 
expression because It appeals only to the most base aspect of individual 
fulfillment'';10 and it announced that the notions of moral corruption and harm 
to society are not distinct . . . but are inextricably linked. It is moral corruption 
ofa certain kind which leads to the detrimental effect on society.''11 I am sure 
that Canadians have only begun to reap the fruits of this confusion. 
In such tentative and disordered ways the new paradigm displaces the old; but 
displace it it does. It is not that we are now agreed about what to do: we disagree 
strenuously about the significance of pornography, about what harm it causes, 
about the risks of limiting free expression, and about matters of institutional 
design. The point is rather that these disagreements are increasingly framed by 
the assumptions that freedom of expression must not be limited unless harm can 
be shown, and that no such analysis can ignore the context of gender relations. 
II. GAY PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW PARADIGM 
As new paradigms do, however, this one gives rise to new controversies, one of 
the most interesting of which involves sexual orientation. If pornography is about 
men harming women, how should we understand gay male pornography? It 
 poses no special problem for the old paradigm: gay pornography is as obscene as 
straight pornography, maybe more obscene. (It certainly attracted more than its 
proportionate share of prosecutions.) But how are we to bring it within the new 
paradigm? 
Most feminist discussions proceed on the basis that pornography is 
heterosexual in its nature and audience. Is this innocuous? One cannot write 
about everything and maybe it is just as well if philosophers avoid subjects where 
their factual knowledge is modest or their empathy slight. Nevertheless, there 
may be risks here. I must content myself with one example. In a helpful and lucid 
paper, Rae Langton defends the new paradigm by explaining how pornography 
may literally subordinate or silence women. Her main idea is that pornographic 
utterances have something in common with the performatives'' of speech-act 
theory: they may authoritatively establish which moves in the sexual game are 
legitimate.''12 Pornography is thus like a biased umpire in a game among players 
of vastly unequal power. She thinks that liberal debate'' operates on the frail 
assumption that pornographic utterances are made by a powerless minority, a 
fringe group especially vulnerable to moralistic persecution,'' whereas in reality 
  pornography's voice is the voice of the ruling power.''13 
Langton's heterosexual presumption is  fundamental  to  her  polemical  project: she 
is trying to make analytical sense out of, and  answer  criticism  of,  some central 
texts of radical feminism, a theory whose center of gravity is the critique of 
sexism and whose attitude towards the critique of heterosexism is often coyand 
sometimes hostile.14 But what happens if we release our thinking from that 
 harness? Will it then remain plausible to speak of the language game of sex''? 
What answer will we give to the question of whether pornography is the voice 
of the ruling power''? Will it still seem foolish to think that pornography is 
produced by fringe group[s] especially liable to moralistic persecution''? 
Without the heterosexual presumption, these questions may all take new 
answers. Perhaps, then, silence about sexual orientation is not so benign after all. 
Perhaps if we theorize about pornography as if its heterosexual variant were the 
only case, the paradigm case, or even just the most interesting case, we will miss 
things that are important for both theory and practice. 
So the first problem is one of scope: the new paradigm may only apply to some 
pornography. This leads to a second problem. When the new paradigm is used to 
recommend censorship, it is on the basis that this will promote the autonomy and 
equal citizenship of women. However, generic restrictions on pornography, 
applied without regard to sexual orientation, may offend the underlying ideals. 
Representations of minority sexualities are not a staple of public discourse, 
advertising campaigns, schoolbooks, television, etc. As Eve Sedgwick remarks, 
  advice on how to help your kids turn out gay, not to mention your students, 
your parishioners, your therapy clients, or your military subordinates, is less 
ubiquitous than you might think.''15 Our public culture in fact presents a 
heterosexual uniformity that is quite astonishing when compared with the diverse 
realities of our lives. So gay people largely make their own way, their existence 
and needs acknowledged only in the margins of popular and high culture. This 
has a consequence: if there are significant differences among different 
 sexualities-different social meanings, different structures of power, different 
possibilities for change-then uniform regulations governing something called 
  pornography'' are liable to have different effects on different groups. When 
books, magazines, art, theatre, films and videos fall under the ban of the censor 
or the chill of lawsuits, it is almost certain that the burden will fall more heavily 
on sexual minorities than on the majority. Heterosexuality does not become 
invisible when the censor cuts. Thus, before we help ourselves to attitudes 
towards, and then prescriptions regarding, pornography'' we had better 
consider whether these differences are indeed significant. 
Here, I offer some reasons for thinking that the differences are real and crucial. I 
defend three claims. First, the meanings of gay pornography cannot be reduced 
to the heterosexual variant, so the new paradigm has no direct application here. 
Second, there is no evidence that gay pornography harms men in the way that 
heterosexual pornography is alleged to harm women, and some reason to 
suspectthat it does not do so. Finally, and more speculatively, I suggest 
that some features of gay male pornography, in particular its capacity to 
objectify people, are not necessarily harmful and may even be beneficial in the 
gay male context. I conclude with some suggestions about what all this 
might mean for our understanding of pornography in general, and for the 
sorts of policies we ought to endorse. 
Occasionally, proponents of the new paradigm do discuss gay male pornography, in 
an attempt to assimilate it to their model. Most philosophically interesting is the 
claim that gay pornography does in fact harm women and is therefore not 
 fundamentally different from heterosexual pornography. This conclusion is 
reached, not by positing an unusual causal path from the effects of pornography 
on its gay consumers to its results for women, but rather by offering a particular 
view of what it is to count as a woman.'' To be sure, other claims and attitudes 
also seem to play a role in the theory. Let us here notice but set aside the panicky 
homophobia to which even radical feminists may fall prey. Andrea Dworkin for 
instance says that: Male homosexuals, especially in the arts and in fashion, 
conspire with male heterosexuals to enforce the male-supremacist rule that the 
female must be that made thing against which the male acts to experience himself as 
male.''16 Thus we have a world homosexual conspiracy allied with the 
heterosexuals-Tchaikovsky with Wagner, Michelangelo with Rubens, Proust 
with Lawrence, Isaac Mizrachi with Ralph Lauren-all shoulder to shoulder, or 
penis to penis, in league against women. Traditionally the last to be chosen for 
every team, gay men are now promoted to first string without any try-outs. But 
the stereotyped association of male homosexuals'' and  arts and fashion'' and the 
suspicions of conspiracy are not secure foundations for a serious social 
theory. That gay men are men, that they can be misogynists and that they enjoy 
some of the benefits of male privilege are all both true and significant. But those 
facts are as true of gay truck-drivers, lawyers, baseball players and university 
professors as they are of film makers, fashion designers and interior decorators. 
And what we need to show here is that gay male pornography causes or contributes to the 
vices that gay men can share with other men. Overt hostility to those in 
stereotypically gay professions does not, as far as I can see, advance this case. 
 III. REDUCTIVISM 
A. THE HONORARY WOMEN THESIS 
Here is a better start. Dworkin also says, The feminine or reference to women in 
male homosexual pornography clarify for the male that the significance of the 
penis cannot be compromised . . . In pornography, the homosexual male, like 
theheterosexual male, is encouraged to experience and enjoy his sexual 
superiority over women.''17 This might strike the casual reader as a misprint, 
or as post- modernism avant la lettre-there generally are no women in 
gay male pornography, for the unprofound reason that gay men rarely 
find women sexually arousing. How then are we to make sense of the 
claim that such pornography nonetheless contains the feminine'' or makes 
reference'' to women thereby clarifying''-in case there were any doubt-the 
significance of the penis in gay male sexuality? 
Perhaps the argument might be completed this way.18 Even if there are no females 
in the text or images, there is always someone who plays the role that patriarchal 
sexuality assigns to  women, the role of receptivity, passivity, subordination,  etc.  
If  one  thought  that  in  most  homosexual  acts  one  partner  is 
  being the man'' and that another is being the woman,'' then we could have 
representations that, in a sense, make reference to women. And since the general 
dominance-based account of pornography already has a story (indeed, a number 
of stories) about how women in pornography are dominated in pornography, 
and about how women's domination in pornography causes and constitutes 
women's domination in the world, we have most of what we need for an account 
 of how a female-less pornography nonetheless literally harms women. We can 
have women without having any females. Thus, we reduce what initially seems 
like an exceptional case to the standard case. In MacKinnon and Dworkin's 
model anti-pornography ordinance we find this definition, Pornography shall 
mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women . . . The use of 
men, children or transsexuals in the place of women . . . shall also constitute 
pornography under this section.''19 Now, this is a piece of proposed legislation, 
not political theory; but we can see how it might draw inspiration from, and in 
any case promote, the theory just sketched. The thought that men may, in a 
certain way, take the place of women'' in pornography I shall call the Honorary 
Women Thesis. 
As reconstructed, however, the Honorary Women Thesis is open to objection. 
For the thesis reduces homosexual acts to ersatz heterosexual acts by projecting 
onto those acts meanings, conventions and distinctions that are indeterminate, 
unstable, and parochial. Consider, for instance, the distinction between  active'' 
and passive'' often used to distinguish masculine and feminine roles in sex. That 
this distinction is often indeterminate is evident if we consider, say, an image of 
two people kissing or engaging in mutual masturbation. Is there a plausible way 
to classify one of them as active and the other passive? Is there in fellatio? It is 
only  when  we  can  map  the  distinction  onto  some  conventional  view  
aboutappropriate gender roles that we say which is which. But in many cases we 
simply cannot.20 The distinction is also unstable. There is often no guarantee as 
to who will end up doing what to whom: a penetrator in one scene may end 
 up being penetrated in another. This is not to deny that some gay men, including 
some gay male pornography stars, experience role stability in some of their 
sexual interests. The point is that this is not, over the entire repertoire of 
familiar sexual acts, sufficiently common to support a reductivist 
interpretation about the categories into which the persons fall. 
Finally, and most important, the distinction is parochial. The meanings that 
heterosexual cultures assign to particular gay male sex acts may not be the 
meanings that gay subcultures assign to them. For a pornographic text or image to 
bear the meaning, for example, Women may be subordinated,'' in a way that 
causes harm, the audience must take it to mean that. It is through attitudinal change 
in its consumers that pornography is said to do its harm. Thus, we need to show, 
not merely that there is a possible gendered reading of the pornographic text or 
image, but that that is the normally recognized conventional reading among its 
audience. Straight men, it is true, sometimes imagine that it is less gay'' to be 
fellated than to perform fellatio, and that tells us something important about the 
meanings that they assign to sex acts. But straight men are not the standard 
audience for gay pornography. Consumers of gay pornography normally do not 
and certainly need not interpret their own sexuality through that lens. The 
parochialism of these distinctions needs to be understood in light of audience 
segregation. Gay consumers of pornography normally consume gay male 
pornography when it is available, and heterosexual men appear not to have any 
significant erotic interest in gay male pornography.21 So even if some people would 
be inclined to construe some men performing some acts as taking the place of 
 women,'' they are likely to be a minority of the audience for gay male pornography, 
and their tastes and interests are unlikely to be catered to by its producers. 
Perhaps some of these objections can be met if we construe the thesis more 
abstractly. One might say that it is not the projection of gendered meanings onto 
body parts, acts, etc. that recapitulates the dominance of men over women, but 
rather the objectifying sexual attention itself. It may not matter that gay men do 
not see other gay men playing the woman'' or that they shift in and out of 
gendered sexual roles. It may be enough that gay male pornography, like other 
pornographies, makes images of bodies available to the gaze for sexualized 
consumption, and that to be the object to another's subject is in itself to be 
feminized. Thus, not merely passive or receptive males, but anyone in 
theobjectified mode, even the so-called active'' partner, is in that way an 
honorary woman, for he functions in the system of sexualized power in just 
the way that women function, and thus pornography remains the graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of women. 
I reserve for Section 5 below discussion of objectification'' in its own right. 
Here I wish to focus only on the link between objectification and feminization, 
the idea that the objectified are somehow turned into women. The argument 
begins on the solid footing that gender is a social construction. As de Beauvoir 
rightly said, one is not born a woman. Rather, this is an identity constituted by a 
variable set of roles, meanings and expectations that are matters of human 
thought and practice. The most challenging varieties of contemporary feminism 
add another feature. A gendered position is not just a matter of social differences 
 projected onto anatomical differences, but it is also a matter of social 
domination, of the unjust disadvantage that those with female bodies 
experience as a result of the gender system. Let us assume that to be right. 
Does it follow, then, that anyone who is dominated in or through sex takes the 
place of a woman? It does not. For gender is not the only asymmetrically 
constructed social difference; the same is true of race and class and, in some 
societies, sexual orientation. To establish that convention or practice constructs 
an asymmetrical ranking of social positions, for instance objectifier and 
objectified, is not sufficient to show that the positions thus constructed are 
gendered ones. Being in a position of dominance is at best one necessary feature 
of the social construction man.'' To count as a man one must not only have this 
(and other) social features, one must also have, pretend to have, or be taken to 
have certain biological features. In particular, one must have (or pretend etc. to 
have) enough of the anatomical features of the male sex.22 The gender distinction 
is, among other things, a set of dominance relations projected onto (presumed) 
anatomical differences. Without the latter we may still have some sort of class- 
ordered relations, but we do not have gender. For that reason, the objectifying 
gaze in gay male pornography does not suffice to produce social women. To turn 
men into women the gaze would need to be a good deal more powerful than it in 
fact is. 
B. THE AFFIRMING EXCEPTION THESIS 
The Honorary Women Thesis rests, then, on an over-simple view about the social 
construction of gender, and it fails to notice the importance of audience 
 segregation in pornography. But there may be forms of reductivism that do not 
fall into either trap. Consider what I shall call the Affirming Exception 
Thesis.This acknowledges that gay men are not in any relevant sense 
women, but maintains that the character of the sex acts depicted 
nonetheless supports heterosexual norms and in that way leads to harm to 
actual women. Here is MacKinnon's version: 
The capacity of gender reversals (dominatrix) and inversions (homosexuality) to 
stimulate sexual excitement is derived precisely from their mimicry or parody or 
negation or reversal of the standard arrangement. This affirms rather than 
undermines or qualifies the standard sexual arrangement as the standard sexual 
arrangement ............. 23 
The idea that homosexuality is in some way a gender inversion'' is a bit quaint, 
but let this pass. What I want to pursue is the independent suggestion that 
mimicking, parodying, negating or reversing the standard'' arrangement 
somehow affirms it. 
Mimicry might be said to affirm a standard by copying it when one might have 
changed it; but the failure of the Honorary Women Thesis shows that gay sex is 
not normally a mimicry of straight sex. What then about parody, negation and 
reversal? Surely they function not as instances of the rule, but as exceptions to it. 
Does breaking a rule in some way affirm that rule? The claim that variations 
from a norm ratify that norm is true only if the variations are also seen as 
deviations, are criticized as such, and if the criticism is regarded as legitimate.24 In 
that case, however, it is not the variations, but the critical reactions to them 
 that affirm the norm. 
It is doubtless true that many critical reactions to gay pornography affirm 
sexist and heterosexist norms. To say that these representations are unnatural, 
sick, weird, disgusting, etc. is to endorse heterosexism. To say that they are 
degrading because they show men allowing themselves to be treated like women 
is also to affirm sexism. These repugnant, common attitudes are here irrelevant 
however, for even in its rare moments of ironic detachment, gay pornography 
does not stand as a critical commentary on the acts it displays and it does not 
elicit these or similar critical reactions from its normal audience. To the extent 
that gay pornography expresses any evaluative attitude at all towards its content, 
it is surely that of tolerating or endorsing it and thus of supporting a different 
norm. 
If we reject those forms of reductivism, what then remains of the claim that 
gay pornography actually harms women? Perhaps it ultimately rests on 
the unacknowledged belief that male homosexuality itself harms women, 
together with the obvious truth that gay pornography affirms homosexuality. 
The thought that male homosexuality harms women is of surprisingly long 
pedigree: in 1785 Jeremy Bentham took it to be one of the main arguments 
he had to refute indefending gay people from persecution.25 Two centuries 
later the argument persists, though in a modified form. No longer is the 
worry that male homosexuality robs women of husbands and children, now 
it is enough that it celebrates maleness, something not thought to promote 
gender equity.26 As MacKinnon puts it, To the extent that gay men choose 
 men because they are men, the meaning of masculinity is affirmed as well as 
undermined.''27 
Let us explore this idea further, for I think that it motivates many of 
the familiar feminist reductionisms. There are two difficulties with the claim 
as it stands. First, gay men do not normally focus their love interests in all 
men but only in other gay men, who are not in fact icons of cultural masculinity. 
(Indeed, to the extent that masculinity-affirmation is done by love-interests at 
all, it is less the work of gay men than of heterosexual women, who 
usually fall in love with heterosexual men.) Second, it is odd to suppose 
that gay male desire is masculinity-affirming just because the love-object is 
male, for the object is loved by a male subject, and on conventional gender 
stereotyping that taints the masculinity of both. It is true that MacKinnon's 
comment allows that gay men both affirm and undermine masculinity in 
choosing men. But surely if something both affirms and undermines a certain 
meaning, the net effect may nonetheless be undermining if the aspects in which it 
undermines are more numerous, significant or weighty than those in which it 
affirms. Consider, for example, race-sensitive anti-discrimination laws. It is 
possible that in just naming and referring to races such legislation affirms 
what we should be concerned to deny: that racial kinds are a proper way to 
classify people. One might say on that basis that anti- discrimination laws 
partly serve to affirm racism. Nonetheless, such legislation simultaneously 
undermines-or at any rate tries to undermine-some of the more serious social 
consequences of racial classification. And if race came to have fewer 
 significant consequences, we might hope that racial classifications would 
become less salient and, perhaps, ultimately irrelevant. At the distant, 
utopian, end of this process, we might even hope for a world without a 
concept of race. Why should something analogous not be true about the 
current meanings of masculinity? Why must the male-centredness  of gay 
male sexuality be predominantly masculinity-affirming? 
Perhaps   this   ignores   an   important   part   of   the   thesis,   however,   for 
MacKinnon's complaint is that gay men choose men because they are men.  I  take 
this to mean that there is something at least prima facie undesirable about 
choosing men as love objects, because of certain things that any such choice must 
express or celebrate. But what does it mean to choose a man    because'' he is a 
man? This is certainly not an empty idea, for a man might choose male sexual 
partners for other reasons: for example, because they are the only ones 
available,as in boarding schools, prisons or the navy. Perhaps the thought is 
this.28 On a dominance view of gender, the class of men is in majority a class 
of those who oppress women. So gay men, in being attracted to members of that 
class, may be attracted to them in virtue of the oppressor-making 
characteristics or correlates of that class: they may seek lovers who are 
aggressive, domineering, self-centered, macho, and so forth. More generally, if 
the category man'' picks out a gender that is defined partly in virtue of its 
dominant social position, then it would be easy to think that if one loves men, 
one must love dominators. This is an ugly thought-though there are no 
doubt some gay men (and some heterosexual women) who do find these 
 traits attractive. But it is in any case mistaken. The context is an opaque one, so 
to say that Alex loves Abe, who in fact occupies the social role man,'' does not 
entail that Alex loves Abe in virtue of this one of Abe's man-making features. 
He may love him in virtue of more benign man- making features, such as his 
courage. Or such social attributes of conventional masculinity may be wholly 
irrelevant to Alex-he may be attracted to Abe's unconventional masculinity, 
or to Abe's embodied maleness, without regard to the rest of his gender traits. 
Even if dominance is a necessary feature of the social position man,'' it is not 
sufficient; we also need to take into account the (real, pretended or perceived) 
anatomical features of the male sex. Homosexual desire, like any other, is 
individuated by its object, and here we need the familiar distinction between sex 
and gender. Homosexual desire in its standard forms is an attraction to people of 
the same sex as oneself, that is, to those  with a similar sexual embodiment. 
The extent to which it is also an eroticized  response to conventional masculine 
(or, in the case of lesbian, feminine) cultural or psychological traits is  highly 
variable. I am not denying that there may be people whose sexuality  is 
oriented to the social gender  of  the  partner  rather  than  to  his  anatomical  sex. 
For  instance,  there  probably  are  some  men  who  are   sexually   enthusiastic 
about, but broadly indifferent among, any of the following set of people: 
feminine straight women, femme dykes, straight male cross-dressers, gay drag 
queens, and effeminate gay  men.  Such  men  are  aroused  by  the  feminine,  but 
not necessarily by females. Does that make them heterosexual? For  some 
reason, I find it hard to think of a man  who  chases  cross-dressers  and  drag 
 queens  as  straight  (unless  he  is  very  shortsighted). 
Sexual orientation is in fact about sex, not gender, and to be attracted to men 
because they are male is what it is for men to be homosexual. In a context where 
being male is an adequate guarantee of social masculinity the two will obviously 
overlap; they may even have identical extensions. In the Symposium, 
Aristophanes calls homosexual boys, the most manly in  their  nature,'' 
because they are chips off the original all-male block.29  But in homophobic 
societies gay men are unlikely to be seen as the most manly of men, and choosing 
one as a lover is not in fact the most masculinity-affirming thing that a guy might 
do-and Aristophanes, that notorious joker, knows it. 
The reductionisms of the Honorary Women Thesis and the Affirming 
Exception Thesis are made at all plausible only by indulging a familiar laxity 
about the concepts of sex and gender. This may reveal a mistaken theoretical 
view of the concept sex'' (that it is equivalent to our concept gender'') or it 
may just be an embarrassed euphemism. It may also be symptomatic of a deep- 
seated dislike of sexual orientations. John Stoltenberg is open about this. He 
writes: To be oriented' toward a particular sex as the object of one's sexual 
expressivity means, in effect, having a sexuality that is like target practice- 
keeping it aimed at bodies who display a particular sexual definition above all 
else . . .'' which, he thinks, is just another form of sex discrimination in the service 
of the status quo and thus to be resisted.30 However, for most people sexual 
orientation is nothing like target practice-it requires neither skill, effort, nor 
repetition. Stoltenberg is here misled by his thought that sexual orientation is a 
 matter of keeping aimed'' at bodies who display a particular sexual definition 
above all else. This is doubly misleading. First, one does not normally need to try to 
keep from drifting into an interest in sexes that are discordant with one's 
orientation. It just comes naturally, so to speak. Second, even when the sex of 
one's partner is a necessary condition for one's attraction and arousal, it is 
normally neither a sufficient nor a uniquely necessary condition-it might not 
even be among the most significant of the set of jointly necessary conditions. 
While gay men are indeed sexually attracted to other males, they are not typically 
attracted to all and any men. There is nothing odd about having other highly 
desirable or even necessary conditions in a boyfriend, for instance that he be 
intelligent, handsome, kind or honest. 
Stoltenberg's wish that sexual orientation itself would go vanish so as to 
promote gender equality has certain affinities with the reductivist thesis. If there 
were no sexual orientations then how could gay male pornography fail to be just 
plain pornography? I am uncertain whether a world beyond sexual orientation, a 
world in which the sexed character of another's body would be beneath erotic 
notice, would be a better or more equitable world than our own. But it would not 
be our world, and possibly not even a world accessible from this one. 
There is here an analogy with the old and dubious idea that androgyny might 
cure sexism. Of course, universal bisexuality would not itself change anything, 
since that too is a form of attraction oriented by sex, though it includes both 
homosexual and heterosexual reponses. What Stoltenberg needs is a  state  of 
affairs in which people have sex without regard to sex at all, in which they 
 eroticize only unsexed features of their partners. What would it take to 
transformhuman sexuality in this way? It is unlikely, for example, that people 
might fail to notice the sex of their partners. Sally Haslanger has argued that 
sex and some form of gender distinctions will probably always be present in 
human society, for there are things about others' bodies that we will not, and 
possibly should not, fail to notice. 
[T]here are reasons why sex is more socially significant than eye-color, that aren't 
wholly arbitrary. I may not notice the eye-color of my sexual partner, but I'd better 
notice whether we are of different sexes so that I can anticipate and be prepared for 
the possibility of conception. And it is not obvious that our cultural narratives 
should ignore the fact that female embodiment and male embodiment involve 
different experiences ............. 31 
None of this is to deny that sex may become extraordinarily different for any of us 
from what it is now and that the hazards into which it may fall might be 
eliminated. But sexual orientation itself will probably remain, and remain what it is 
now: a benign human variation. 
IV. ANALOGOUS HARMS 
There may be other ways to defend the reductionist thesis, but let us leave it 
behind. Gay pornography might fall within the new paradigm even if gay men 
are in no sense women, if they occupy no similar position, and if sexual 
orientation is an inevitable feature of human sexuality. For even if gay male 
pornography does not harm women, it may do something relevantly similar: it 
may cause some men to harm other men. It may incite them to abuse, rape or 
 discriminate against other men; it may subordinate and silence the victims of this 
abuse; it may legitimate this whole system of oppression. This, then, is a second 
sense in which men might be said to take the place of women'' in pornography. I 
need to underscore that this is not what the new paradigm itself contemplates- 
as I said above, it is harm to women rather than harm to people in general that it 
takes to be distinctive of pornographic materials. Whether pornography might 
also harm men has not seemed an urgent worry. 32 In both cases, however, the 
moral concerns are similar. If harm to women warrants special attention, then so 
surely does harm to men. But does gay male pornography harm men? 
Those who are confident that there are analogous harms may motivate their 
hypothesis with certain general claims about the nature of male sexual desire 
andthe way it responds to pornography. Andrea Dworkin, for instance, says 
that, 
  [M]ale sexual aggression is the unifying thematic and behavioral reality of male 
sexuality; it does not distinguish homosexual men from heterosexual men''33- 
though, she admits, an exceptional and minuscule'' minority of both gay and 
straight men escape it. Normal male sexuality, on this view, is aggressive; sexual 
orientation is only a matter of the preferred victim. Domination is just what all 
men enact in sex; pornography incites and legitimates it. Straight men do it to 
women; gay men to men. 
I will not here test these undefended assertions about the essence of male 
sexuality. But I do want to explore the connection between them and a 
dominance-based theory of pornography. If both aggressor and victim are of the 
 same sex, there can be no sex-linked definition of a victim-class. And if that is so, 
there can be no gay analogue of the war of men against women-gay male 
sexuality would be more like the war of all against all. How then does dominance 
figure in the homosexual context? 
When we consider the constitutive harms of pornography, the subordination 
and silence that it is said to express and the discrimination that results, we need 
to keep track of who is doing what to whom. Let us look again at the way the 
new paradigm analyzes the heterosexual case. It begins with the observation that 
women suffer abuse and discrimination at the hands of an oppressor class of 
men, it formulates general psychological and sociological hypotheses about what 
causes the oppressors' attitudes, and then it suggests ways in which pornography 
might contribute to attitude formation: by conditioning, legitimating, and so on. 
Consider now the relevant analogy. Do gay men suffer analogous harms? Can 
they be imputed to the acts or blameworthy omissions of an oppressor class? And 
what is the composition and psychological make up of that class? 
Allowing for difficulties in applying the notion of  oppression'' to men, there is 
nonetheless no serious doubt that, even in so-called liberal countries, gay men 
are now often attacked, abused, subordinated, silenced and discriminated 
against.34 So there is one similar set of harms. Here is another: gay boys and men 
may also internalize the homophobic attitudes of their environment and in that 
way come to share the oppressors' view of them. There is, therefore, at least a 
prima facie similarity in the nature and significance of the disadvantages in 
question. But is this causally connected with the existence or content of gay male 
 pornography? That is unlikely, for there is also a profound dissimilarity here. It is 
not gay people under the spell of their pornography that bash other gays, restrict 
their civil liberties, censor their expression, divide their families, inhibit their 
marriages, and so on. Whatever role straight pornography plays in the complex 
causal network that keeps women in their place, gay pornography 
obviouslyplays a much different role in keeping gay people in their place, for that 
is by and large the work of straight people. Here, the oppressor class, if there is 
one, is in the wrong socio-erotic location. 
This elementary fact is shockingly under-recognized. The most significant 
forms of abuse and subordination that gay men suffer are at the hands of 
heterosexual people including, especially, their parents, siblings, pastors, 
teachers, doctors, landlords and employers. Still, in one authoritative 
compendium of research on the general subject of gender violence,'' we find 
thirty-four chapters about heterosexual male violence directed against women, 
and one about violence against gay men, and that is about partner abuse in 
lesbian and gay relationships.35 Gay bashing-the most overt and familiar form 
of violence suffered by lesbians and, especially, gay men-is, in five hundred 
pages of close analysis by politically engaged scholars, mentioned exactly once. 
This example may fairly stand as a paradigm for the way many writers think 
about the oppression of gay men. In the first place, they do not. In the second 
place, they imagine it taking place at the hands of other gay men. Of course, if 
that were the reality then there might be some reason to wonder whether the new 
view of pornography might apply beyond the heterosexual context. What 
 makes gay men do this to each other?'' they might ask. Someone will surely 
answer, Their pornography!'' The reality is quite otherwise. Although partner 
abuse is real enough, violence that targets gay people, as well as the more routine 
forms of hatred, discrimination and systematic disadvantage, may generally be 
imputed to people who are, or purport to be, heterosexual. 
Our theories about pornography should therefore show some humility (and 
perhaps also shame) in the face of the lack of interest, of research and, thus, of 
evidence about the nature and sources of the harms suffered by gay men. Note 
that I am not arguing that because there is no available evidence that gay 
pornography causes gay men to harm other gay men, it must not. I am making 
only two points. First, if we begin with the new paradigm's view of the harm the 
pornography causes women, we will find that the analogous harms suffered by 
gay men are not in the main caused by gay men. They are caused by heterosexual 
women and men whose attitudes are not significantly influenced by gay male 
pornography. Thus, while in the gender-dominance theory of pornography the 
oppressor class and the class of consumers of pornography strongly overlap, in 
the reality of lesbian and gay life, the oppressor class and the class of consumers of 
gay pornography are disjoint. Second, while not denying that gay men may 
sexually abuse each other and discriminate against each other, there is no 
adequate evidence of the role of pornography in causing or constituting this 
abuse. 
I want to conclude these admittedly sketchy remarks about evidence with one last 
point. It is important to bear in mind that if our question is what attitudes to 
 pornography we should adopt and what policies we should enforce, then we need to 
think in terms of a legislative standard of proof, and not an  adjudicative standard. In 
many political systems  courts have the power to review and strike down 
legislation if it offends the local constitution. But there is a crucial difference 
between the kind and weight of evidence a court needs to conclude that a 
legislature's act may stand, and the kind of evidence a legislature would need to be 
justified in legislating. Courts  with  review  powers  should  generally defer to 
legislators about the  relevant  facts,  for  courts  lack  the  time,  resources and expertise 
to inquire into them. Thus, there might be enough evidence for a court to be 
justified in upholding such legislation once passed, and yet there may not have been 
enough evidence to warrant passing it in the first place. (And that is why arguments 
about the constitutionality of restricting pornography are a poor guide to the moral 
and political question of whether pornography should be restricted.) Ignoring this 
distinction has misled many  theorists  and,  especially, many lawyers. MacKinnon, 
for example, has said of the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in Butler that, 
The evidence on the harm of pornography was sufficient for a law against it.''36 
This is wrong. Even if the evidence meets the deferential standard to which the 
Supreme Court of Canada holds its Parliament, it does not follow that it is 
sufficient to justify such a law. (Nor did the Court say that it was.) It shows only 
that it was held sufficient for such a law to be constitutional, that is, within the 
legal powers of the government. Whether criminalizing pornography is also a wise or 
just exercise of  those  powers  is another question entirely. If we bring this distinction 
to bear on the possible harmfulness of gay pornography to gay men, I believe that 
 we will find that the evidence meets neither the legislative nor the adjudicative 
standard.37 Compared to what is actually known about the harmfulness  of  straight  
pornography,  the fairest way to describe what we know about the  effects  of  gay  
pornography would be nothing at all''. Taken together with the fact that  the  
relevantly analogous harms are here caused by the wrong audience, the argument  
from analogy  seems  implausibly  weak. 
V. OBJECTIFICATION AND SUBJECTIFICATION 
I want to return now to the matter of sexual objectification. This is claimed to 
be one of the main ways that straight pornography harms women, and it 
issometimes said that gay pornography promotes a similar sort of objectification 
of gay men.38 Allowing that the evidentiary basis is poor, it may nonetheless 
be fruitful to explore some more speculative ideas, beginning with the notion 
of 
  objectification'' itself. Martha Nussbaum thinks this is a kind of category 
mistake.   One is treating as an object what is really not an object, what is in fact, a 
human being''; objectification is thus a matter of   making into a thing, treating as 
a thing, something that is really not a thing.''39 This can be done in a variety of 
ways, she argues, for example, by treating people as instruments, by denying their 
subjectivity, denying their autonomy, or by treating them as lacking agency, or as 
violable, ownable, or fungible. Her subtle discussion establishes that there are 
complex relations among these and  that whether objectification is morally 
problematic  depends  on  the  context. 
While we can see what this Kantian distinction between persons and things is 
 driving at, it is also potentially misleading. For contrary to Nussbaum's 
suggestion, the objectification of people is not a matter of treating as an object 
what is not an object or a thing, because in many ordinary senses people are 
objects and things. Human beings are embodied; we are extended in space; we 
exist in time; and we are subject to the laws of nature. Objectification is not 
reification. It is a matter of treating as a mere object something that is also more than 
an object; it is a matter of denying or devaluing their subjectivity, of failing to 
recognize them as ends in themselves.'' To be treated as a sex object is, in 
part, for one's own desires, hungers and needs in sex to be removed from view 
and to be seen solely as a means to the fulfillment of the desires, hungers and 
needs of another. 
The point I have in mind parallels one we must make about Kant's categorical 
imperative: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at 
the same time as an end.''40 There is here no prohibition on treating people as 
means. What is forbidden is to treat them merely as means. This puts a constraint 
on the instrumentality of others: they may be treated as means to our ends only if, 
in doing so, we also manage to respect their integrity as agents with their own 
purposes who, as Kant also puts it in another place, must themselves be able to 
share in the ends to which we put them.41 That is why it is so difficult to lead a 
good life. We must treat others as instruments, for we need their skills, their 
company, and their bodies-in fact, there is little that we social creatures can do 
on our own, and so little of that is fulfilling. However, while we need to use 
 others, in doing so we may not treat them as mere instruments, and that is not 
always easy.In ordinary sex we need others as objects in some of the most 
ordinary senses of the term: they are intentional objects of our desire, we 
want to see, smell, touch and taste their bodies. This is not yet sexual 
objectification, however, for that involves subjecting them to our purposes 
without regard to their own. There is of course a tradition (of which Kant is one 
of the more notorious exponents42) that sees sexual desire as essentially fraught 
with danger. Despite some similarities with the new paradigm of 
pornography, this cannot be what is at issue here, for on the new view the 
gendered dimension is intrinsic to objectification-men's desire is inherently 
dangerous-while for Kant women's sexual desire for men is no better. The 
new idea is rather that straight pornography produces women as sexual objects 
because it represents women as meat, available for consumption and without 
regard to whether they can share in the ends to which they are put. Women, 
who are both objects and subjects, are said to be represented as mere objects. 
This causes two sorts of grave harm. First, it is a kind of subordination, since it 
injures their dignity by denying their personhood. That is what we might, to use 
Foucault's language, call the productive power of objectification. Second, having 
been constructed as objects, it leaves women open and available to abuse of 
other kinds: being beaten, raped, etc. This is the repressive power of 
objectification. 
Objectification does not, however, actually change the moral status of  a 
person, for that is not a matter of social convention.43 To treat people as if they 
 are mere objects does not make them mere objects. Objectification says that 
people are not the very things that they are: the whole possibility of insulting or 
degrading someone's personhood begins on the footing that it embodies a kind of 
lie about her status. Our subjectivity is an un-won status, something we get for 
free, without effort, as is our objectivity. What has to be won is our own 
awareness of our subjectivity-we need to see ourselves as the ends that we in 
fact are-and others' respect for our subjectivity. However, and here is my main 
point, the same is true of our objectivity. 
Let me approach this idea through an example. Our instrumentality is one 
important part of our objectivity; it is the property of being of potential use to 
others who may direct us to their own purposes. This is not sufficient for our 
dignity as persons; but some who endorse a disembodied view of personhood 
would go further and say that is it not necessary either. Interestingly, non- 
philosophers do not agree. Most people desperately want to be of use to 
others,and they come to understand themselves partly through their uses, 
actual and potential. Of course, they do not want only that, and they want to be 
of use and used subject to certain constraints-but the idea of being useful is in 
fact valued. Part of what is at stake when people age, when they are severely 
disabled, when they are chronically unemployed, is the fear that they are not, 
or are no longer, useful. Others do not want them; they fulfil no valued role. 
They miss not only their diminished agency, but also their diminished 
objectivity. In dire cases people may no longer see themselves as something 
desired, wanted, or useful at all, even as they retain their standing as civic 
 subjects, applicants, supplicants, users or consumers. They become, to coin a 
term, subjectified. 
Straight women in a patriarchal society rarely have difficulty seeing themselves 
as sex objects: that idea is reinforced in myriad ways through parental and peer 
pressure, television, popular novels, music, videos, fashion, and also straight 
pornography. A better society should support a wider range of self-conceptions, 
enable all women more easily to see themselves as subjects, and secure greater 
respect for their subjectivity. But what about men, and, in particular, gay men? 
Andrea Dworkin thinks that objectification is just the essence of male sexuality 
and thus in male homosexuality both partners by definition objectify.''44 But 
definitional truths come too cheap. If instead we allow the facts to intervene, how 
frequently do gay men find themselves objectified (and objectifying) in a 
heterosexist society? Consider this observation by a gay American writer: 
 
[W]ith the history many of us had of being branded eggheads or aesthetes, the 
prospect of being apprehended as pure, dumb, meat has an irresistible allure. It's as 
close as some of us can imagine to being loved unconditionally''-not for our 
clever accomplishments but simply for the mute flesh that we are.45 
 
This passage suggests that being apprehended as pure, dumb, meat''-being in 
that way objectified-is for many gay men a substitute (and a poor substitute) 
for being the object of unconditional love. That is one explanation for why 
someone might want to feel the kind of objectification that results from some 
pornography: it may give access to what is socially foreclosed. Of course, this 
 suggests that that substitution is somewhat pathological, or at the very least, 
second-rate. But I think a broader, de-pathologized, version of this idea is worth 
exploring. 
In a patriarchal society, and in its straight pornography, women are often 
apprehended as dumb meat. This is the social context of many pro-censorship 
arguments: they purport to be subjectivity promoting. In a heterosexist society, 
however, the standard apprehension of the gay man is quite different. First, he is 
most often simply invisible or non-existent. Second, when he does occasionally 
flit in and out of the frame, it is most often in the figure of one of the dominant 
stereotypes: aesthetic, sensitive, different, fabulous, foppish, and so forth. 
Whengay boys are taunted for being fairies'' the image is of something airy, silly 
and gossamer; it is stereotyped femininity without being a sex-object. (Do fairies 
even have sex?) It is not too difficult to see here the risk of a different sort of 
harm- the lack of public acknowledgement of, and sometimes even personal 
access to, one's sexuality. Another man writes in his autobiography: 
 
Fearful of the intensity of my sexual longings and still wary of being punished if I 
admitted that being gay'' was about sex and not about books or politics, I felt 
fragmented and even more isolated. Though I had constructed a life that revolved 
around my identity as a gay man, I refused to admit the importance that sexual 
desire played in this.46 
 
Naturally, I do not claim that being subjectified in these ways represents the 
experience of all gay men, still less that it is true by definition. But it is one 
 common and especially salient experience and, as these passages show, one that is 
represented in gay culture and in the self-understanding of gay people. That is 
why coming out to oneself'' means not just acknowledging one's own desires but 
also the harder work of seeing oneself as a possible object of the kind of desire 
that one has. I suggest that just as being objectified is a kind of motif 
experience47 for straight women in patriarchal societies, being subjectified is a motif 
experience for gay people in heterosexist societies. I do not deny that there are also 
aspects of full civic and human agency that are denied gay people: innocent 
sex acts are widely criminalized, legal marriage is generally impossible, and so on. 
And it would be an exaggeration to think that the subjectivity of gay men is in 
every respect as precarious as that of heterosexual women. However, when 
lesbian and gay sexualities are regarded as unnatural, disgusting, perverted, 
immoral, sick, or just plain weird, one thing gay subjects may lose or fail to 
develop is a robust sense of their own objectivity. Without that, a gay sexuality still 
can be spiritual, political or intellectual. What it cannot be is hot, wet or fun. One 
can see oneself as different, special, or sensitive, or, in the jargon of post- 
modern   queer theorists,'' as having an ironic, parodic or performative attitude to 
gender.48 But one cannot easily see oneself as sexy. There is a real loss here. As 
Wallace Stevens put it in his poem,   Esthe'tique du mal'': 
The greatest poverty is not to live 
In a physical world, to feel that one's desire  
Is too difficult to tell from despair.49 
 
 We need therefore to be cautious in addressing and evaluating complaints 
about urban gay culture in wealthy countries: that it is looks-ist,'' that it 
overvalues youth, that it promotes the fungibility of sexual partners and the 
impermanence of relationships. Some of these do echo familiar complaints about 
sexist society. But there are also important differences. First, in the gay context 
these complaints embrace stereotypes whose foundations in reality need to be 
tested-particularly the association of gay men with promiscuity. Second, this 
culture is in any case but one, possibly small, fragment of life among 
homosexually inclined men in our societies. Third and most important, while 
heterosexual pornography may be said to reflect, repeat and endorse the general 
sexist view of women, homosexual pornography does not reflect, repeat or 
endorse the general heterosexist view of gay men. 
In that social context, and facing those challenges, how should we regard texts 
or images that do objectify gay men? Ambivalently, I hope. As sexual beings gay 
men need to be treated as ends in themselves, and most pornography does little to 
help that; but if they are to be sexual they also need to be treated as, and to be 
able to see themselves as, the possible object of another's desire. That is one of 
pornography's contributions, some of the time. When gay pornography does 
objectify we still need to remember that that is but one vector in a complex space 
of social interactions. In a homophobic society most of those are, for gay men, 
both sex- and body-negative. In its dissenting voice, gay pornography celebrates 
the male body as sexually desirable to other men; it displays men enacting this 
desire; it focuses our attention on that one fact about them; it exaggerates and 
 overvalues it. Even if that is sometimes bad in itself, it does not follow that it is 
bad overall. That depends on what is going on in the rest of society, and not just 
on what is going on in an urban gay subculture. What if the dominant culture 
systematically denies and represses the desirability of men to other men? What if 
it targets for discrimination and abuse those who feel, acknowledge or act on that 
desire? What if it simply behaves as if sexual desire is by nature heterosexual? In 
that context-which is to say, in our context-how should the lusty voice of 
objectification be heard? What net effects on the lives of its consumers might it be 
expected to have? Gay pornography contributes to gay life what is everywhere 
else denied-that gay sexualities exist, that gay men are sexual beings, and that 
men may be objects of male desire. How highly we value all that surely depends 
on the baseline from which we start. For some objectivity comes easily, 
subjectivity must be won. For others, including many gay men, subjectivity is 
fairly secure; it is objectivity that feels precarious and fragile. 
VI. CONTEXTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Let me summarize, then moralize. There is little reason to think that gay 
pornography causes the same harms as straight pornography, or even analogous 
harms. Moreover, some common features of pornography, for instance, 
promoting sexual objectification, may be expected to have significantly 
different consequences for gay men than they do for straight women. So, 
whatever the (here unassayed50) strengths of the new paradigm in understanding 
heterosexual pornography, it will need substantial modification before it can 
begin to illuminate the moral problematic of gay pornography. 
 Could we just leave it there, confining the new paradigm to its natural habitat, 
and theorize non-heterosexual pornography separately?51 That might be an 
advance. But perhaps the problem of sexual orientation suggests other sorts of 
trouble for the paradigm. Object choice-the kind of person or thing one finds 
arousing-is but one sort of sexual variation, and sex of object choice, what we 
usually call sexual orientation,'' is only one further subdimension. Our 
sexualities vary in many other ways. For instance, there are other, non-sexual, 
variations in object (some people prefer younger or older partners, homo- or 
hetero-racial partners, smarter and duller partners, and so on) and there is also 
what Freud called variations of sexual aim'' (some people would rather look 
than touch, some are genitally-focussed others are not, etc.). The powerful, and 
artificial, binarisms of gay'' and straight'' currently dominate our public sexual 
culture, but they do not displace a lush ontology of private sexualities. 
That being so, we might begin to wonder about other pornographies too. If 
gay male pornography is significantly different, then  surely so is lesbian 
pornography-it is not difficult to see how some of the arguments offered here 
might be extended to that case. But then what about sado-masochistic 
pornography, or even heterosexual pornography catering to that exceptional 
and minuscule'' proportion of non-violent male desire? Are we to say that these 
are not pornography'' in the meaning of the act, that the new paradigm is 
correct and illuminating about the central case and inadequate only in marginal, 
deviant cases? Are we perhaps to say that these are not even pornography'' at 
all, but  erotica,'' or something else? 
 We might of course do all of this, were there any reason to. But that merely 
shows that the new paradigm may be made consistent, not that it is correct. Here 
as elsewhere political philosophy cannot ride on the back of definition. While 
some suppose that there is an interesting distinction to be drawn between 
pornography and erotica, it is in fact idle. There is, of course, a usable distinction 
in ordinary language: erotica is less explicit and less visual than is 
pornography.But that is not what the objector has in mind, and her 
stipulative distinction misinterprets the interplay between our normative 
judgments and our classificatory  systems  in  this  area.  People  do  not  
classify  artifacts  into 
  pornography'' or erotica'' and on that basis form moral and political 
judgments about them. On the contrary, the judgments are engaged from the 
beginning, and erotica'' is often little more than a label whatever sort of 
pornography is judged tolerable. There is no point in stipulating a narrow 
definition of pornography'' and then pretending, if it turns out that gay 
pornography slips through that net, there is no such thing as gay pornography 
strictly speaking. At this point, wisdom has taken a holiday. Gay male 
pornography is pornography if anything is,  and  if  it  does not  harm  women 
then that gives us all the reason we need to reject a gendered definition of 
pornography. 
There is a broader conceptual point at stake here, and I want to conclude with 
a couple of remarks about it. Pornography is not an aesthetic kind, but a loosely 
related  family  of  artifacts  bound  by  analogy  and  function:  it  is  mostly 
   masturbation material.''52 But when you think of it that way, it is easy to see 
why there are unlikely to be many true and morally significant generalizations 
about the harmfulness of such material. It all depends on who is aroused by what, 
and on what their respective social positions are. The only way there could be 
moral laws governing the kind, pornography,'' would be if our sexualities were 
more or less the same and if they were treated in more or less the same way by 
society. That they are not and that this makes all the difference has been the 
central argument of this paper. 
Is the concern about context purely theoretical? Sadly, it is not. MacKinnon 
and Dworkin call the Butler decision a breakthrough in equality jurisprudence'' 
for they suppose that it replaces moralism with attention to harm, and that it 
heralds a new sensitivity to equality. But after Butler the record of the state in 
attending to pornography has been just what one would have predicted53: among 
the first prosecutions was a lesbian magazine with a paid Canadian circulation of 
a few dozen. Then, Canadian customs officers continued their pattern of ignorant 
and homophobic seizures targeting women's and lesbian and gay bookstores. 
(One of the most amusing was the 1994 customs detention of The Sexual Politics of 
Meat, a tome of feminist-vegetarian critical theory en route to a bookstore 
specializing in women's spirituality and ecology.) 
Wholly undeterred by these wholly predictable events, MacKinnon and 
Dworkin still defend their view. Now empiricists, they find the connection 
between upholding the obscenity laws and impounding lesbian, gay and feminist 
books deemed obscene to be based on   sheer innuendo; no cause-and-effect 
 linkhas been shown. Canadian customs employees have been doing what they 
have been authorized to do for years before Butler.''54 But this ignores a point 
crucial to their analysis of heterosexual pornography. The fact that the 
oppression of women is overdetermined does not prove that pornography lacks any 
effect. It is practically certain that mainstream religions, popular music, 
professional sports and typical family life are all much more invasive and 
authoritative agents of sexist oppression than are pornographic books or videos-
but that does not show that pornography is not also on the list. Likewise, the 
fact that there are other sufficient causes is quite consistent with the fact that 
customs officers feel reassured and even emboldened by the declared 
constitutionality of the obscenity laws. Upholding the constitutionality of 
criminal prohibitions on obscenity does not only effect criminal prosecutions 
about obscenity. Here, where the idea of 
  legitimation'' has literal import, these theorists seem to miss it. 
I began by criticizing some Canadian judges, so let me end by giving another 
Canadian judge the last word: 
[E]rotica produced for heterosexual audiences performs largely an entertainment 
function, but homosexual erotica is far more important to homosexuals . . . [S]exual 
text and imagery produced for homosexuals serves as an affirmation of their 
sexuality and as a socializing force . . . it normalizes the sexual practices that the 
larger society has historically considered to be deviant . . . it organizes homosexuals 
as a group and enhances their political power. Because sexual practices are so 
integral to homosexual culture, any law proscribing representations of sexual 
 practices will necessarily affect homosexuals to a greater extent than it will other 
groups in society ............. 55 
I hope that my arguments suggest why this is correct. And at least some forms of 
contemporary feminism have the conceptual resources to recognize it, for the 
new paradigm of pornography is not the only advance in the field. Equally 
important are the claims that the concrete is as important as the abstract, the 
contextual as the universal. Would it be all right to begin to take these ideas 
seriously-not just theories of knowledge or the metaphysics of morality, but 
even in practice and even in our thinking about pornography?56 If we do, how 
long will we remain content with the idea that pornography is about men 
possessing  women,  that  all  male  sexuality  is  about  power,  that  
sexualobjectification is always harmful, that pornographers set the rules in the 
one and only game of sex? And if those claims need qualification, how far will 
we need to rethink our prescriptions in the area of public policy? Will broad-
ranging criminal prohibitions or wide rights of civil action prove justifiable? If, 
in sum, we regulate pornographies as if they were all just pornography, how will 
the values of autonomy or equality really be affected? To ask the question 
is to answer it. 
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